What’s wrong with incest?
Josef Fritzel was convicted today and sentenced to life in prison by an Austrian court. Fritzl trapped his own daughter in a basement “dungeon” for 24 years, raping her 3,000 times over a 24-year period. (That works out to about twice a week.) As the BBC notes, “the story of Josef Fritzl has been described as one of the worst cases in Austria’s criminal history.” But is it?
Whoever thinks that Fritzl is even close to the worst criminal in Austrian history clearly hasn’t heard about Heinrich Gross, an Austrian doctor who tortured and killed hundreds of children–not to mention, of course, Austrian painter and memoirist Adolf Hitler. But of course I agree that Fritzl’s crime is horrible. In addition to enslaving and raping his daughter for a quarter century, he admits to letting one of the resulting children die in the dungeon due to illness, rather than seek medical attention and risk being caught.
But what if Fritzl had committed the very same crimes, trapping a stranger rather than his daughter? The aspect of this case that has generated so much attention–and why some consider it “one of the worst cases in Austria’s criminal history”–is that it involves the taboo of incest.
Consider a thought experiment posed by moral philosopher Jonathon Haidt: “Julie and Mark are brother and sister. They are traveling together in France on summer vacation from college. One night they are staying alone in a cabin near the beach. They decide that it would be interesting and fun if they tried making love. At very least it would be a new experience for each of them. Julie was already taking birth control pills, but Mark uses a condom too, just to be safe. They both enjoy making love, but they decide not to do it again. They keep that night as a special secret, which makes them feel even closer to each other. What do you think about that, was it OK for them to make love?” (PDF file of Haidt’s article.)
What is your answer to Haidt’s question? Is the act of incest, in and of itself, morally wrong?
–John Bohannon
March 19th, 2009 at 1:23 pm
Note: there are many, many things wrong with the possible side effects of incest. The risk of genetic disease is greatly increased due to the single-copy recessive traits we all carry in our genomes. (Combine two copies of the same mutated genes that run in families and the baby can suffer developmental abnormality, mental handicaps, and many other problems.) But even when incest does not produce offspring, there can be psychological harm, particularly if it is between a parent and child. Haidt’s thought experiment controls for all these external costs. His question is about the very act itself, not its side effects.
So what might be the harm or wrong in the act itself? (Peter Singer has posed a similar question about bestiality. It’s a real challenge to come up with an answer.)
–John Bohannon
March 19th, 2009 at 6:51 pm
Interesting you bring up that scenario as it was discussed at the NUBC last week. You’re definitely correct in that the “weirdness” and overall “creepiness” of this story is that this IS his daughter. It far surpasses inexcusable. In the case of the brother and sister. I find it very weird that a brother can be attracted to his sister and vice versa in the first place. But back to the issue at hand. You are right in that the problem with two siblings engaging in sexual activities is the reproductive aspect and the almost inevitable repercussions that would ensue should the siblings have a child. BUT in this case, the very thing that is wrong with the act was being prevented. So, almost by definition, this act should be permissible. However, why is it that every time I think about it, I’m repulsed?
Even just sitting here thinking about it, I cannot think of anything fundamentally wrong with it, assuming they are not reproducing but at the same time, I’m overcome with the “yuck factor”.
Good point: WHY is this still wrong if they’re preventing the consequence which makes this act illegal in the first place?
March 19th, 2009 at 7:19 pm
It’s difficult to answer this kind of question because answers will vary between two extremes based on personal, religious, and educational views. Personally, I think that the act of incest being morally wrong varies from situation to situation. In this case, a father took advantage of his daughter, a minor. I don’t think that should be morally permissible because of the responsibilities that a father has towards his daughter. No father should lock up his daughter and rape her countless times. On the other hand, two siblings who make love out of curiosity, I believe, is morally permissible. Science tells us that if they did procreate a child that there would be a higher risk of passing on genetic disorders to the child. However, the fact of the matter all comes down to one thing in this case: consent. In the case of the two siblings, they were both curious and decided it would be fun to try. They both gave mutual consent to the act and it was clear that they had no intention of producing a child. In the case of the daughter and father, it is clear that the daughter didn’t consent to being locked up for 24 years. Had consent been present, perhaps the father wouldn’t have needed to lock her up and could have continued to have sex with her.
March 19th, 2009 at 9:13 pm
the thing that is esp. violating in the fritzl case is that it is not *just* incest, but incestuous *rape* (and imprisonment, and neglect unto death, &c). that is, abuse of a person (later people) one might normally expect to be within the family circle of protection. it’s scary the same way any abuse within a circle of intimates is: that’s where there’s an expectation of safety, if anywhere.
in other words, there’s a model that says that a daughter should be safer with her father than just about anyone else. obviously this is wrong in the example given; obviously it is wrong in other circumstances too. if nothing else it’s far more convenient and less subject to public scrutiny to hurt your own offspring than somebody else’s.
haidt’s question seems relevant b/c of the incest, but it lacks the aspects of rape and violation of safety within the family that i think really drive the horror of the fritzl case.
March 19th, 2009 at 9:27 pm
Vicka, thanks for reminding us that it is RAPE. This wasn’t consensual… making it all the more outrageous. Maybe not the “worst’ criminal Austria’s ever had but pretty darn close if you ask me.
March 19th, 2009 at 9:32 pm
But the question at hand is the morality of incest itself. Haidt’s thought experiment is designed to force us to confront our intuitions. Taboos have an “ick factor” component that can be very powerful–and also irrational. The fact that Haidt’s vignette lacks the rape and violation is the whole point… right?
March 20th, 2009 at 6:31 am
For most of history, sex and reproduction have been linked. It may be that this is the reason that incest is one of very few universal taboos across virtually all cultures. Additionally, sexual freedom, particularly for women, has been a cultural “problem” because it makes paternity of children questionable. Haidt’s thought experiment is interesting because it attempts to remove the possibility of reproduction as the outcome of the sexual act. But, because it is simply a thought experiment, it also removes any of the potential negative psychological consequences from siblings engaging in sex with each other. I am not a psychologist, but my bet is they would have a field day with this thought experiment. It’s hard to believe that two siblings having sex would have no lasting psychological ramifications.
Sexual intimacy is what you decide it is. It can be treated like nothing special and used simply for the pursuit of pleasure (hedonism) or it can be treated as something very special that creates a lasting bond between two people. I think something very special is lost when sexual intimacy is treated simply as a “new experience” and not something that helps to bond two people together in a special relationship.
That said, a level of sexual experimentation between very young siblings is typically considered a normal part of sexual development. Depending upon the age of the siblings, this type of consentual “play” is not prosecuted.
To confuse this topic even more, there are real cases available to consider. For instance there is a case where a couple thought they might both be the offspring of the same sperm donor. The couple decided against being tested because they were in love and intended to marry. If they were half-siblings, the state would not give them permission to marry. I don’t remember what their plans were for procreating. Is this morally problematic? What about two step-siblings (or adopted siblings) who develop a relationship? Or Woody Allen who married his step-daughter? Is there a moral boundary that should preclude a sexual relationship when there is a pre-existing familial relationship even if it isn’t genetic?
March 20th, 2009 at 10:05 pm
In Haidt’s thought experiment, he never specifies whether the brother and sister are related by blood. I think the question asks people to examine their assumptions behind social relationships rather than genetic relationships. I think an implicit assumption that we make is that brothers and sisters do not have sex. When they do have sex, they break their prior relationship as brother and sister. If two people have sex, it contradicts the notion they are brother and sister, because we apply those terms to people we assume do not have sex. I think when incest does occur, it breaks a social tie and forms a new one: i would no longer think of “mark” and “julie” as brother and sister. Their relationship as partners or lovers would take precedence.
March 21st, 2009 at 9:33 am
I think our repugnance for incest is an evolutionary vestige. Being able to perceive the “ick factor” helped us decrease the risk genetic disease in our offspring, and we created social mores around this intuition to enforce it. Now with contraception, incest doesn’t cause evolutionary harm, but we’re still left with the social and psychological conditioning that says it is harmful.
Does this mean incest isn’t wrong anymore, and we should go against our (now useless) instincts? Depends on how you view morality. Let’s see what we’ve agreed on so far:
1. The Fritzl case is repulsive because it involves incest and a betrayal of familial trust (i.e. lack of consent).
2. However, it is wrong only because of the non-consensual aspect. We’re unsure whether the incest is wrong in itself.
I think that in drawing a line between what is “wrong” and what is merely “repugnant,” we are implicitly assuming that moral reasoning must be rational. If our “ick factor” in response to incest can’t be justified by a reasoned process, then we are hesitant to elevate that intuition to the status of a true “moral” value.
Haidt’s example about the brother and sister challenges us to question this assumption of rationality. As he points out elsewhere in the paper (pdf), even the “reasoned process” behind seemingly legitimate moral values can be reduced to a series of post-hoc rationalizations. We construct morality to bolster judgments that first formed as intuitions, not the other way around. If you’re a liberal on gay rights, you’ll see this in John Finnis’ condemnation of homosexuality (pdf, p.4). If you’re a conservative, chances are you’ll find his arguments the epitome of carefully reasoned moral philosophy.
One quick conclusion from all this is that our instincts matter just as much as supposedly “rational” moral values. Maybe “repugnant” and “wrong” aren’t separate qualities of an act, but both ways of tapping into the same deep-rooted adaptive instinct that we all have. Incest isn’t necessarily wrong because it is bad — it is wrong because it used to be bad, and that badness is still encoded in our psychology and communal values.
April 4th, 2009 at 9:08 am
The last comment make a good point about the disgust about incest being inherent in us from an evolutionary perspective. However, it seems that feeling of disgust itself does not exhaust the content of a judgment of immorality. I feel disgusted when I watch some programs on TV, but in only few instances do I also feel that what is being shown is immoral. In a sense, when I perceive an immoral action I am gripped by an intuition that seems to go much further than disgust, or sentiment in general. I am by no means a paramount case but one has to start somewhere.
This does bring into focus the lengthy debate between rational morality (following Kant) and sentimental morality (following Hume), and in a rather interesting way. On rational grounds, incest with proper birth control, seems quite alright (although Kant was not a fan of sex in general) but we are quite willing to say nevertheless that there is something wrong with incest even in non-harm causing cases, which is where disgust comes in. But, it is also the case that not every one does think so. Even those, such as myself, who do not and would not practice incest are willing to say that even though they feel that incest is disgusting, it is not morally wrong. To put it plainly, if I were to witness an act of consensual and safe incest I would likely squirm but I would not feel compelled to denounce it.
Ultimately, from my discussions with others, I conclude that the wrongness of incest is not immediately obvious. Indeed, it very much depends on how you define wrongness itself. If wrong is just the kind of action that goes against certain plausible moral principles (do not harm, say), incest is not inherently immoral. If, however, wrong is just the kind of action that causes a sentiment of disapprobation (following Jesse Prinz’s constructive sentimentalism theory) in the observer, then incest is, largely, wrong. While I am sympathetic to the later view, I think it is, to put it simply, not good enough. I am far more inclined towards the former view.
April 5th, 2009 at 9:52 am
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May 10th, 2009 at 10:31 pm
I’m actually a psych major and the thought of a brother and sister wanting to be romantically involved is elementally wrong on more than a few levels. You don’t need to be a psychologist to know that. The inclination, never mind the action, that one would like to engage in sexual intercourse with their direct sibling is a definite sign of inner confusion. I agree with previous posts, once a more serious relationship is established, no matter how brief or how often it occurs, that relationship takes precedence over any previous one. If you have sex with your best friend of four years, they are more than just your friend. They will always be more than just a friend. You can not negate a sexual experience, no matter how brief or seemingly inconsequential the interaction, a relationship can never be the same once it has reached the extreme of sexual intercourse. That kind of relationship between siblings is not something we are capable of handling emotionally or psychologically.
May 16th, 2009 at 9:24 am
Adam, with all due respect, you have strongly claimed that sexual intercourse between siblings is wrong but failed to say anything about the wrongness. Just what is wrong about it? From the length you devote to it my guess is that you seem to imply that by having sex with my sibling we will become more than siblings. But that is trivially true. I become more than a stranger to someone once I have exchanged a greeting with them. I fail to see how this added layer makes the relationship wrong in any significant way. Furthermore, I simply cannot agree with your last statement. To say that “we are capable of handling emotionally or psychologically” incest demands evidence and I do not know of any valid psychological studies that have shown this to be the case.
Another point I want to address. “The inclination, never mind the action, that one would like to engage in sexual intercourse with their direct sibling is a definite sign of inner confusion.” This claim seems to be unacceptably vague. Just what would the siblings be confused about? Are you referring to the transference of feelings for some non-related person to my sibling? In all fairness, this seems to be covered in the conditions of the situation where we specifically state that the attraction is genuine and mutual and in that case I fail to see any kind of “confusion” that could be taking place.